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Anderson: Child Support: Implications of Abortion on the Relative Parental

COMMENTARIES
CHILD SUPPORT: IMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION
ON THE RELATIVE PARENTAL DUTIES*
A minor child's' right to paternal support, maintenance, and education
has been described as an "absolute, inalienable right . . . which no form

of contract between the parents . .. may affect." 2 Although judicial enforcement of this right is usually sought by the postnatal child, an unborn child 3
has been permitted to enforce its right to paternal support through a guardian
ad litem when the mother, prior to the child's birth, has attempted to alienate
this right by a contract with the father.4 Nevertheless, since Roe v. Wade,5 the
inalienability of the unborn child's right to support has been questioned both
7
judicially6 and editorially.
In Wade the United States Supreme Court held that the "word 'person,' as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."8 This
EDITOR'S NOTE: This commentary received the University of Florida Law Review Alumni
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the
Winter 1976 quarter.
I. "Child" in this commentary refers both to the legitimate and the illegitimate child.
The early common law did not provide the illegitimate child with a right to paternal
support. See generally H. CLAim, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS §54 (1968); Robins & Deak,
The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative Study, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 308 (1930); Comment, Domestic Relations - Illegitimates-Father's Duty To Support,
28 N.C. L. REv. 119 (1949). Today, all states require parents to furnish their illegitimate
children with support. Goodman, Oberman, & Wheat, Rights and Obligations of Child
Support, 7 Sw. L.J. 36, 66 (1975). Moreover, any state supported distinction based on
illegitimacy that denies to the illegitimate the right to parental support appears to
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973). In Gomez the Supreme Court held that "once a State posits a judicially
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there
is no constitutionally sufficient. justification for denying such an essential right to a child
simply because its natural father has not married its mother." Id. at 538.
2. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 92 Cal. App. 355. 358,
268 P. 415, 416 (1928). Accord, Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1975);
Wilson v. Wilson, 251 Ky. 522, 65 S.W.2d 694 (1933); In re Adoption of P.J.K., 359 S.W.2d
360 (Mo. App. 1962). See also 4 S. PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS
ch. 11, §4 (1688).
3. In this commentary the phrase "unborn child" refers to all stages of gestation from
conception to birth. Technical terms such as "embryo" and "fetus" refer to medically
defined stages of gestation, which are irrelevant to a legal discussion of child support.
Where necessary the term "postpartum child" will be used to emphasize the distinction
between the live born child from the unborn child; otherwise, the word "child" refers
only to a child born alive.
4. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940). Accord
People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
1931); Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Swan, Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implications, 9 VAL. L. REV. 243, 272 (1975).
8. 410 U.S. at 158.
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characterization of the unborn as a non-person raises two questions in the
paternal support context. First, does a nonperson have a legal right to
paternal support?9 Second, if such a right exists, does the mother, who under
Wade has the right to terminate her pregnancy, 10 also have the right to
"bargain away any potential rights of the fetus including support"?" To
answer these questions, the legal rights and duties of the interested parties
must be examined. Accordingly, the purpose of this commentary is to analyze
the interplay of interests of the concerned parties - the mother, the unborn

child, the state, and the father
interests.

-

and to evaluate the priorities of these

HISTORY OF THE R IGHT TO PATERNAL SUPPORT

The early common law imposed only a moral duty on parents to support
their legitimate children.' 2 The source of this duty has been variously described
as the "natural law,"" "natural right,"'4 and the "plain precept of universal
law"' 5 and has been frequently "accepted as a matter of course without the
assignment of any reason."' 6 The most logical explanation for the duty is

simply that the parents are biologically responsible for the creation of a
person incapable of supporting himself.17 Gradually, this moral obligation
evolved into a legal duty. Today every state, by statute' or by judicial decision,' imposes a legal duty on parents to support their minor children.

9.

As one commentator noted: "It seems that the law has put itself in the anomalous

position of protecting the legal rights of one who is considered to have no legal right
to live." Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,
46 NOTRE DAAiE LAW. 849, 850 (1971).
10. The court held that abortion during the first trimester is to be left to the
medical judgment of the mother and her physician. During the succeeding trimesters, the
state is allowed to regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health." 410 US. at 164.
11. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431, 433 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
12. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953); Bazley v. Forder, [1868]
L.R. 3 Q.B. 559. See note I supra.
13. Denning v. Star Pub. Co., 94 Ind. App. 300, 308, 180 N.E. 685, 687 (1932).
14. Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 620, 44 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1947).
15. 2 J. KEr, COMMENTARES *189.
16. Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 584, 211 P. 619, 619 (1923).
17. "By begetting them, therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation to
endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life they have bestowed shall be supported and
preserved. And thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving maintenance
from the parents." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmEMrATsus *447 (emphasis original). More
pragmatically stated, "[t]he wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that
some person maintain them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the parents as the
most fit and proper person." 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARmS 189.
18. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §196 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:100-1 (1969) (duly
enforced by criminal sanctions); N.Y. FAMmY CT. Acr §§413-14 (1975). See generally C.
VERNiER 4 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 56-57 (1936); Goodman, Oberman, & Wheat, supra
note 1, at 36-37.
19. See, e.g., Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 89 P.2d 621 (1934); Porter v. Powell,
79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890).
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Traditionally, the obligation of child support rested on the husband
because of the common law disability of the wife, 20 but today a wife is able

to own property, contract, and sue in her own name and is thus more able
to provide support for her children. The current trend, as recognized by
the majority of state courts, is to place the duty of child support primarily
21
on the father and secondarily on the mother.
Most jurisdictions view the father's duty to support his minor child as the
natural outgrowth of paternal responsibility and the child's inability to
provide for himself.22 These courts have traditionally refused to allow a
2
father to escape his support obligation by contracting with third persons
24
or the mother, at least when the interests of the child are adversely affected
by this agreement. 25 The Florida First District Court of Appeal in Walker
v. Walker2 held that state public policy required voiding a contract between
the mother and the putative father of an illegitimate child "to the extent
that [the contract] purports to affect the rights of the child." 2 7 Although the
court recognized the general rule that a properly executed release of the
father's legal duty to support would be enforced, 28 the opinion expressly
stated:

20. "The common law, in an earlier stage of its development, stripped the wife of her
personal property, transferred to the husband the income of her real estate, vested in him
the right to her earnings, denied to her the power of contracting, and merged her legal
entity into his; and, to compensate her for these disabilities, it absolved her from nearly
every legal obligation and duty, including that of maintaining her children." Fulton
v. Fulton, 52 Ohio 229, 237, 39 N.E. 729, 731 (1895). Regarding the common law disabilities
of a wife, see 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES *130.
21. See, e.g., McQuade v. McQuade, 145 Colo. 218, 358 P.2d 470 (1960); Duncan v.
Duncan, 146 So. 2d 255 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1962); State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 42 N.W.2d 680
(1950). "The father's primary duty usually means that only his assets are to be considered
in determining the support of the children regardless of the income and assets of the
mother." Comment, Domestic Relations: The Expanding Role of the Mother in Child
Support, 27 ARK. L. REv. 157, 158 (1973). Some states, however, provide that the duty
of child support falls jointly and equally on both parents. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § §196-97
(West 1975). Passage of the equal rights amendment would apparently require that the
duty be equally applied to the mother and the father. 118 CONe. REc. 9331 (1972) (remarks
of Senator Bayh). For a general discussion of the impact of the equal rights amendment
on parental rights and duties, see Note, Abortion: The Father's RightT, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
441, 458-62 (1973); Note, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 Mica. L. REv. 1581, 1609-11 (1972).
22. See note 17 supra.
23. See, e.g., Poetker v. Lowry, 25 Cal. App. 616, 144 P. 981 (Dist. Ct. App. 1914).
24. See, e.g., Fox v. Hohenshelt, 19 Ore. App. 617, 528 P.2d 1376 (1974); Reynolds x.
Richardson,
Tenn. App.
, 483 S.W.2d 747 (1971).
25. See, e.g., State ex rel. Church v. Young, 32 Kan. 292, 4 P. 309 (1884); State ex rel.
Rengstorf v. Weber, 102 Neb. 103, 166 N.W. 120 (1918). These decisions hold that no
contract between the parents of an illegitimate child will preclude the state from instituting
proceedings for the child's support if the child becomes a public charge; however, this
action will not accrue if the child is receiving adequate support.
26. 266 So. 2d 385 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
27. Id. at 386.
28. Id. at 387. See also BurT v. Phares, 81 W. Va. 160, 94 S.E. 30 (1917).
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[S]uch general rule is subject to modification, however, when, as here,
the rights of a helpless child are directly involved and no sufficient
amount29for child support is included in the consideration paid for the
release.
The clear intent of the court was to protect the welfare of the child despite
a concomitant infringement of the parents' contractual rights.
FRA1rEwoRK OF THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY

The availability of abortion since Wade30 has created questions regarding
the continued justification for a state protected right to paternal support.31 In
Shinall v. Pergeorelis,32 a Florida appellate court examined the issue in the
context of a contract between the natural parents of an illegitimate child
that was intended to release the putative father of all future liability for
child support for a consideration of five hundred dollars.3 3 The court, following the Walker rationale,M held that the contract was void as against public
policy to the extent it purported to affect the rights of the child; 35 however,
the opinion considered at length the appellant-father's contention that such
a public policy is no longer supportable after Wade.36
The appellant in Shinall noted the following three arguments in the
Wade decision: 1) a putative father has no legal interest in the unborn
child since he has no legal right to participate in the abortion decision;37
2) an unborn child is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment; as and 3) the mother's right to privacy encompasses a decision to
terminate the life of her unborn child. 39 Thus, the father argued that a
29.

266 So. 2d at 387-88.

20. See note 10 supra.
31. See notes 6-7 supra.
32. 325 So. 2d 431 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
33. Id. at 432. The instant paternity suit was brought subsequent to the child's birth
although the release in question was signed before the child was born.
34. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
35. 325 So. 2d at 432-33.
36. Id. at 433-34.
37. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Coe v. Gerstein, 376
F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla.), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), affd sub nom. Poe v. Gerstein,
517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 96 S. Ct. 3202 (1976); Doe v.
Rampton, 866 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974). See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
38. 410 U.S. at 158. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
39. "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation." 410 U.S. at 154. The Court recognized that a state may have
a compelling interest in protecting the life of the fetus after viability that would override
the mother's right to privacy. Id. at 162-64. However, the Court did not provide the unborn
child with any constitutional protection but merely permitted the state to protect the
life of the unborn after viability if it chose to do so. "If the State is interested in protecting
fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period
[post-viability], except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added). See also Witherspoon, Impact of the Abortion Decisions
Upon the Father'sRole, 35 THE JuiusT 32, 35 (1975).
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mother's right to control an unborn child is exclusive4° and that, consequently,
1
she may negotiate a full release binding on the unborn child.4
The court in Shinall rejected the appellant's argument on the basis that
42
the right of the father to veto an abortion is not yet a settled question;
however, such an escape is no longer available to a court since the decision
in Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth.43 In this case the United States Supreme
Court struck down a spousal consent requirement for elective abortions, noting
"that the State cannot 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state
itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first
trimester of pregnancy.' "4
Although the Shinall court did not face the Danforth decision, it did consider a similar result reached in the Fifth Circuit decision, Poe v. Gerstein,45
which declared unconstitutional a Florida statute that required the husband's
written consent to an abortion. 46 In its opinion the Fifth Circuit stated that
a fundamental reason for its refusal to grant the father a veto in the abortion
decision was that: [T]he father's interest in the fetus is not sufficiently weighty
to prevent the exercise of the woman's fundamental right. Since the fetus is
not a person ...

neither is it a 'child.'

"47

The court in Shinall stated that the

Poe rationale "obviously collides with the long-standing public policy of this
State as enumerated in Walker v. Walker" 48 reasoning that:
[I]t is inescapable that if a father has no right to determine the destiny
of the fetus and the mother is solely vested with this right of life or
death, then surely the mother possesses the exclusive right to destroy
or otherwise
bargain away any potential rights of the fetus including
49
support.
To avoid this "inescapable" conclusion, it is necessary to advance a continued

justification for the absolute nature of the child's right to paternal supporta justification that is compatible with the Wade and Danforth decisions.

40. 325 So. 2d at 433.
41. Id.
42. Id. See text accompanying note 49 infra. But see 325 So. 2d at 434 (McCord, J.,
concurring specially) ("I am not prepared to in effect rule at this time that if the opinion
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Poe v. Gerstein is upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court and if the quoted statement from the Fifth Circuit's opinion becomes the law of this

state, a mother will then have the exclusive right to bargain away support for her child.').
43. 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
44. Id. at 2841.
45. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub non. Gerstein v. Coe, 96 S. Ct. 3202 (1976).
46. 517 F. 2d at 797. FLA. STAT. §458.22(3) (1975) provides that a pregnant woman must
obtain the written consent of her husband, except if the husband is living voluntarily apart
from the wife, and that an unmarried pregnant minor must obtain the written consent
of her parents, custodian, or legal guardian before a non-therapeutic abortion can be
performed.
47. 517 F.2d at 796.
48. 325 So. 2d at 433. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra for Walker rationale.
49. 325 So. 2d at 433.
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INTERESTS OF THE MOTHER

Only recently has the mother's right to custody and control of the postpartum child been accorded equal recognition with that of the father. 50 Indeed,
the mother's duty to support the child is still considered secondary to that
of the father in most jurisdictions. 51 Thus, it appears that modern law regards
the mother's interest in the postpartum child as equal to but no greater than
52
that of the father.
In contrast, the relative interests of the mother and the father in the
unborn child appear to be quite disparate. 53 Biological reality necessitates
55
that the care and control of the child en ventre sa mere54 rest in the mother.
It is not self-evident, however, that the mother's exclusive control over the
physical well-being of the unborn child precludes the existence of paternal
interests.5 For example, the law of guardianship has long permitted the
father to appoint a testamentary for a child who is en ventre sa mere at the
father's deathS7 Nevertheless, since Wade the courts have consistently refused
to uphold any interest of the father in the unborn child that might infringe
on the mother's right to privacy. 55
One important concern of these courts has been the mother's health. In
a case of first impression, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Jones v. Smith5" refused to grant an injunction sought by a putative father
to restrain the mother of his illegitimate child from obtaining an abortion.60
The court opined that any interest of a natural father, whether married or
50. Compare Phifer v. Phifer, 198 Ark. 567, 129 S.W.2d (1939) with Smith v. Smith,
213 Ark. 636, 212 S.W.2d 10 (1948).
51. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §61.13(b) (1975), which expressly provides for equal consideration
of the father's and the mother's interests in determining child custody and visitation rights.
Despite the statutory equality of rights, the Florida supreme court frequently presumes
that if all other factors are equal, the child of tender years will be best cared for by
the mother. See, e.g., Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975); Anderson v. Anderson,
309 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975). This presumption is not a recognition of any greater rights of
the mother in the child but merely an extension of the equity court's responsibility to
provide for the best interests of the child. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1975).
53. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1975).
54. The term is of French origin and means "in its mother's womb." BLCK'S LAW
DxicroNARY 619 (4th ed. 1968).
55. O'Neill & Watson, The Father and the Unborn Child, 38 MoD. L. REv. 174, 177
(1975).
56. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1975). Recent English
cases have distinguished between the right to care and control and the right to custody
and have held that these rights may be separated and vested in different persons if the
situation requires it. Custody is thus confined to the technical meaning of "exercise of
parental rights." See, e.g., Jussa v. Jussa, [1973] 9 All E.R. 600. Accordingly, the father
of a viable fetus might apply for custody of the unborn child, the award of which would
logically preclude the mother from destroying the fetus through an abortion without his
consent. Note, supra note 55. See text accompanying note 116 infra.
57. See, e.g., Gardfier v. Hall, 132 N.J. Eq. 64, 76, 26 A.2d 799, 806 (1942).
58. See note 37 supra.
59. 278 So. 2d 339 (4th D.C.A la. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974).
60. Id. at 344.
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unmarried, would "certainly be subservient to the health of the pregnant
woman .... "61 As the United States Supreme Court noted in Wade, modern
antiseptic techniques make it generally safer for the mother to obtain an
abortion, at least within the first trimester, than to carry the pregnancy to
term.6 2 Furthermore, Wade recognized that if the mother's health were seriously
threatened by the pregnancy, she could obtain a therapeutic abortion regardless
of the stage of gestation.63 Thus, it appears that in a situation when the life
of the mother must be balanced against the life of the unborn child, or against
the interests of the father in the unborn child, the mother's life is to be
regarded as preeminent.64
To suggest, however, as the court in Shinall has, that the mother's
preeminence in a life or death context necessarily vests her with the right
to contract away her unborn child's right to paternal support is presumptive.65
In the abortion cases the potential life of the unborn child was balanced
against existing fundamental rights of the mother - the right to privacy"6 and
the right to life itself.6 7 In contrast, a public policy that prevents a mother
from contractually alienating her child's right to support obviously does not
threaten the mother's right to privacy except in a very attenuated sense. It
does not outweigh the interests of the unborn child and the interests of
the state in preserving the child's right to support.
INTERESTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD

To a contention that a child en ventre sa mere was a non-entity,
Buller, J., said: "Let us see what this non-entity can do. He may be
vouched in recovery ....
He may be an executor. He may take under
the Statute of Distributions ....
He may take by devise ....
He may
have an injunction; and he may have a guardian."'68
Modem law has added to this list of rights of the unborn the right to recover
in tort for prenatal injuries69 and the right to bring an action in equity for
enforcement of paternal support. 70

61.

Id. at 341.

62. 410 U.S. at 149.
63. "Only when the life of the pregnant mother herself is at stake, balanced against
the life she carries within her, should the interest of the embryo or fetus not prevail."
Id. at 150.
64. Id.
65. 325 So. 2d at 433. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
66. 410 U.S. at 152-53.
67. The right to life is expressly protected by the first and fifth amendments of the
United States Constitution.
68. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. Rsv. 554, 558 n.25 (1962), quoting from Thellusson v. Woodford, 31
Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (Ch. 1798).
69. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
70. Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940). Accord,
People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. Los Angeles County
1931); Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 A.2d 1189 (1936).
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Perhaps property law is the area in which the rights of the unborn child,
regardless of the stage of gestation, have been most protected.- Courts have
held that an unborn child is entitled to an accounting of the father's intestate
estate; 72 is included in the ordinary meaning of "children" in a will; 73 is con74
sidered to be a life in being for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities;
75
is allowed to take under a will as a tenant in common with its own mother;
and is allowed to take remainders, whether vested or contingent, as though
living when the estate was created.7 6 These legal protections of the unborn
child's property rights have lead one pre-Wade commentator to conclude
that at least in the law of property "the unborn child is a person from the
77
moment of conception."
Initially, this conclusion is difficult to reconcile with Wade's characterization of the unborn child as a nonperson; 78 yet, on reflection, it becomes
apparent that in every case in which the law has recognized the legal existence
of the unborn child, it has been to protect a legal right that is contingent on
live birth. In Wade the court recognized the existence of contingent rights
and interests of the unborn that could be perfected only on live birth.79
A California court in Kyne v. Kyne s0 analogized the unborn child's right
of paternal support to a property right."' Closely paralleling the contingency
concept of Wade, the California court stated that a "child conceived, but
not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary
for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth."8 2 Even though postWade law may not recognize the existence of a legal person in the unborn
71. "Ithas been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts in
respect of estate matters . . . that a child en ventre sa mere is 'born' and 'alive' for all
purposes for his benefit." In re Holthausen's Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143, 175 Misc. 1022,
1024 (Sur. Ct. 1941). See also Note, The Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception
of Life, 56 IowA L. Ruv. 994, 999-1000 (1971).
72. Wallis v. Hodson, 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (Ch. 1740).
73. Doe v. Clarke, 126 Eng. Rep. 617, 618 (C.P. 1795).
74. Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 124 (Ch. 1798).
75. Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1852).
76. See, e.g., Barnett v. Pinkston, 238 Ala. 327, 331, 191 So. 371, 374 (1929); Crisefield
v. Storr, 36 Md. 129, 145-46 (1872).
77. Note, supra note 71, at 1000.
78. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
79. "Mhe law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it,
begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined
situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth." 410 U.S. at 161
(emphasis added). In speaking of the unborn child's right to inheritance, the court stated:
"Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live
birth." Id. at 162.
80. 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
81. Id. at 127, 100 P.2d at 811. "In Kyne v. Kyne an unborn child came before the
court by a guardian ad litem for the purpose of compelling the father to provide support.
The court held that the child had such a right and that the father had such a duty.
The rationale of such a decision is based primarily on the rights that the unborn child has
always enjoyed in property law." Note, supra note 9, at 360-61.
82. 38 Cal. App. at 124, 100 P.2d at 809. The court further held that "interests" meant
"anything that is profitable or beneficial to the child." Id.
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child,3 courts frequently do intervene prior to birth to protect the rights
of the postpartum child.8 4 To this end the law appears to apply traditional
concepts of due process to pre-birth judicial proceedings that may affect the
rights of the subsequently born child.85
The law does not permit the statute of limitations to run in favor of
an adverse possessor and against a remainderman who has not yet come
into possession of his estate on the theory that the remainderman's cause of
action against the adverse possessor does not accrue until the remainderman
is entitled to possession. 6 Similarly, the law should not allow a child whose
right of action against the father for support has not yet accrued to be dispossessed of that right by a contract between the parents in which the child's
interests were not adequately protected.17
INTERESTS OF THE STATE

The state's authority to impose liability for child support on parents
derives from its inherent parens patriae power.8 8 Under this concept, it is
presumed that resident minors are state wards.8 9 Therefore, the state has a
twofold interests in delegating the responsibility for the support of these
wards to parents. Naturally, the state is vitally interested in properly maintaining, developing, and educating its future citizens. 90 To this extent the
interests of the state generally coincide with the best interests of the child. 91
The state also has a legitimate interest in protecting its purse and quite
naturally seeks to place the burden of child support in the hands of private
parties whenever possible.9 2 Parents are generally regarded as the most logical

83. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
84. See, e.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
85. See, e.g., Deal v. Sexton, 144 N.C. 158, 56 S.E. 691 (1907). In speaking of an
unborn child the supreme court of North Carolina concluded that "a person must have
an opportunity of being heard before a court can deprive him of his rights, and . . . an
unborn child, not having been made a party, can recover from those claiming his title." Id.
at 160, 56 S.E. at 692. Accord, Botsford v. O'Conner, 57 Ill. 72 (1870).
86. See, e.g., Anderson v. Northrop, 30 Fla. 612, 12 So. 318 (1892). "A reversioner or
remainderman during the continuance of a prior life estate is not affected by the statute
because his action in ejectment to recover the property does not arise until the life estate
ends, as the life tenant alone can maintain the action." 3 A.L.P. §15.8 (1952).
87. This proposition is in accord with states that declare a contract between the
parents voidable at the option of the state if the contract does not adequately provide
for the child's support. See note 25 supra.
88. See Swan, Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implications,
9 VAL. L. Rv. 243, 244 (1975).
89. See Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918), appeal dismissed, 251 U.S.
535 (1919).
90. See Fischer v. Meader, 95 N.J.L. 59, 111 A. 503 (1920).
91. "[I]n all cases the state is parens patriae to the child, and it has the power . . .
to determine what is for the best interests of the child, and that which will promote the
welfare of the state." Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 187, 190 P. 1020, 1022 (1920).
92. "It is essential to the welfare of the state that infants be fed, clothed, lodged, and
educated; and also that the state shall not be burdened with their care." State v.
Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 300, 134 S.W. 519, 521 (1911).
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parties to bear the burden of supporting their children. 93 If the family unit
is intact, the interests of the state in imposing child support liability on the
parents do not conflict unduly with the interests of the parents or of the
child. "The obligation of parental duty is so well secured by the strength
of natural affection, that it seldom requires to be enforced by human laws." 94
In a situation such as Shinall in which the interests of the parents are at odds
with each other as well as with those of the child,9 5 the state interest in
providing private support for the child may very well conflict with certain
interests of the parents. In the Shinall case the court's invalidation of the
release frustrates the parents' right to contract. 96 Nevertheless, practical
necessity dictates that the contract rights of the parents must yield to the
support right of their child. To hold otherwise would leave the state with
the unacceptable alternative of supplying the support if the mother
97
subsequently becomes indigent.
INTERESTS op THE FATHER

Ordinarily a father has a primary duty to support his minor children. 8
Earlier cases sometimes referred to the father's duty of support as the correlative of his right to custody and services of the child.99 The concept of reciprocal
rights and duties vesting in the father emerged as one logical justification for
the paternal duty to support a child. "This doctrine of reciprocity has little
practical significance while the family unit remains intact, for in such a case
the incidents of support, custody, and services are consolidated. ' 10 If the
unity has been destroyed through divorce or has never been established, as in
illegitimacy, the courts have had to determine the more difficult ramifications
of such reciprocity. '1 1 For example, if the father is deprived of custody through
divorce, will the court refuse to impose liability for support even if the result
is to place the dependent child on welfare? Modern courts have tended to
discard the doctrine of reciprocity in such situations, holding that the "father
[is] financially liable for the support of his minor children, regardless of

93. See text accompanying note 17 supra and note 97 infra.
94. 2 J. KENT, COMmENTARmES 190. See also text accompanying notes 100-101 infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
96. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
97. Courts are reluctant to enforce a contract that results in the child becoming a
public charge. The controlling issue in such a case was stated succinctly in Barrett v.
Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934): "If the one into whose custody the child has
been given . . . has become indigent . . . and can no longer take care of the child's

needs, the question is, shall the burden of its care be permitted to become a public
charge or the subject of private charity, or fall where it naturally belongs, on the
parent?" Id. at 512, 39 P.2d at 624.
98. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
99. See, e.g., Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 462,
464, 194 P. 1, 2 (1920); Fischer v. Meader, 95 N.J.L. 59, 62, 111 A. 503, 504 (1920);
Ex parte Wallace, 26 N.M. 181, 190, 190 P. 1020, 1024 (1920).
100. Note, Reciprocity of Rights and Duties Between Parent and Child, 42 HARV. L.
REv. 112, 113 (1928). See also Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 517, 39 P.2d 621, 624 (1934).
101. See Note, supranote 100, at 113.
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custody. ' ' 10 2 In custody and support proceedings the emphasis is on the welfare
of the child;' 0 3 furthermore, the father's duty to support his minor child is
independent of any rights of custody or services of the child.104
The imposition of this duty prior to Wade was justified by the presumption
that the father, in voluntarily bestowing life, had impliedly assumed the duty
of supporting that life.- 5 Since Wade some courts have questioned this
justification because the link between the father's "bestowal of life" and
the child is now subject to interruption by a voluntary abortion.10 6 "[T]he
decision to convert the nonperson of pregnancy into a person - with the legal
demands for support such an infant person can enforce- is exclusively the
mother's.' ' 0 7 Therefore, using the tort doctrine of shifting responsibility0 "
as an analogy, one commentator argues that if the mother elects to proceed
with pregnancy, "the fact that a defendant-father's deed played an initial
physical role in the process is of no legal effect because responsibility has
shifted from him."' 1 9 He further suggests that the ability of the mother to
elect an abortion has reduced the father's "legal status relative to his unborn
children [to] that of a helpless bystander." 1 0
Similarly, in Shinall the Florida court reasoned that under Poe the father
no longer had a sufficient legal interest in the unborn child to prevent the
abortion; therefore, he should no longer bear the financial responsibility for
11
the mother's decision to bear the child.
Although the father may not veto the abortion decision this does not mean
that he should no longer have a duty to support his child or that he may
be able to escape his duty by a contract. Danforth did not find that the father
had no legal interest in the unborn child but merely concluded that his interest
was not sufficient to grant him a veto over the mother's decision to have an
abortion." 2 The father's interest in the unborn child as its biological progenitor appears sufficient to justify the state's imposition of a duty to support the
102.

Id.

103. See, e.g., Lipscy v. Battle, 80 Ark. 287, 97 S.W. 49 (1906); Kyne v. Kyne, 38
Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940). See also Note, Male Parent Versus Female
Parent: Separate and Unequal Rights, 43 U. Mo.-K.C. L. REv. 392, 405 (1975); O'Neill &
Watson, supra note 55, at 176.

104. See Barrett v. Barrett. 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P.2d 621 (1934); In re Estate of Goulart,
218 Cal. App. 2d 260, 32 Cal. Rptr. 229 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Hoover v. Hoover,
307 Ill. App. 590, 30 N.E.2d 940 (1940).
105. See, e.g., Niesen v. Niesen, 38 Wis. 2d 599, 157 N.W.2d 660 (1968). See also text

accompanying note 17 supra.
106.

See, e.g., Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1975).

107. Swan, supra note 88, at 253.
108. According to this defense, "the defendant may not be required to take any precautions for the plaintiff's safety, because he is free to assume that someone else will do
it or will be fully responsible in case he does not." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §33, at 176
(4th ed. 1971).
109. Swan, supra note 88, at 261.
110. Id.at 256.
111. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
112. "A husband and father has two interests which might be endangered by his
wife's abortion: an interest in the fetus with which his wife is currently pregnant and
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